Developing countries rich in fossil-fuels face a unique challenge posed by climate change. They seek to extract fossil fuels at a time when the global community must reduce carbon emissions. Effective global climate policies and low carbon technologies will likely reduce the demand for fossil fuels, creating the risk of 'stranded nations'-where resources under the ground become commercially unattractive to extract and a substantial share of a nation's wealth may permanently lose its value. This constitutes a parallel to the stranded assets challenge faced by the private sector.
INTRODUCTION
Developing countries rich in carbon-emitting fossil fuel resources such as oil, gas, and coal face risks from climate change-both in terms of the direct impact of a changing climate, but also the effects of climate action and technological innovations that seek to limit greenhouse gas emissions, and therefore may give rises to a decline in fossil fuel demand. This is because a significant portion of their national wealth and a major sector of their economy is tied to fossil fuels at a time when the world needs to transition away from such carbon-intensive energy.
These countries face a dilemma. They seek to drive economic development and reduce poverty using revenues and investment associated with extracting these resources, but doing so drives the consumption of oil, gas and coal contributing to climate change. In turn, such climate change is likely to severely impact these very same countries (IPCC 2001 (IPCC , 2014 . On the other hand, if their fossil fuel resources remain in the ground, they may miss out on a significant opportunity to develop their economies and alleviate poverty.
2 This challenge is combined with currently low commodity prices, a failure by many of these countries to build up net savings during the boom and global pressure to curb new fossil fuel consumption. As such these countries find themselves under serious and urgent pressure to chart the right way forwards for their economies (van der Ploeg 2016).
CARBON MARKET RISK TO STRANDED NATIONS
Building on the emerging "stranded asset" debate ( Leaton 2013 , Rozenberg et al. 2014 ) that has focused on the repercussions for fossil fuel companies, in this paper we consider the impact on fossil fuel-rich developing countries. The carbon market risk we examine occurs if, over the long term, fossil fuel demand permanently declines, and with it prices for fossil fuels.
The prospects for a global shift away from fossil fuel consumption are growing. Governments at the Paris COP21 talks agreed to limit the global temperature increase to 2 degrees, with an aspiration of keeping temperatures below 1.5 degrees warming. This 2 degrees' target implies that to ensure that temperatures stay within this limit, more than two thirds of current fossil fuels must remain in the ground (IEA 2012) . To achieve this, governments may impose climate change policies that reduce demand for, or even supply of fossil fuels. Further, the advancement of alternative energy sources to fossil fuels may begin to take substantial market share from fossil fuel producers. This risk of a permanent fall in fossil fuel prices for producers we term here as the 'carbon market risk'.
If this carbon market risk is already priced into commodity markets, governments of fossil fuel-rich developing countries can use current market prices signals to guide long term decision making. However, market prices may not be a perfect signal of these long term risks. First, the significant year-on-year fluctuations in prices make it difficult to discern the long-run trend in prices and complicate long-term planning based on these prices for governments. Second, market prices of commodities may not hold significant informational content of expectations past more than a few years at most. As an example, the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (one of the world's largest markets for commodity futures) offers trading on oil futures contracts up to nine years forward, but figure 1 shows that trading volumes of contracts with maturities past 12 months are currently minimal (CME 2016) . Given the cost of storing commodities such as crude oil, and therefore the difficulty in speculators making long-term bets on prices, the value of using commodity prices to understand long-term risks such as the carbon market risk described here is severely limited. Source: Chicago Mercantile Exchange. "Crude Oil Futures Quotes". Accessed August 2, 2016. http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/energy/crude-oil/light-sweet-crude.html Notes: Contracts are for Light Sweet Crude, CME Globex product code "CL".
Figure 1. Proportion of total daily trades of Crude Oil Futures contracts
Given the lack of market signals on the one hand, and the significant impact if carbon market risks are realised on the other, it may be important to consider the implications of an uncertain future for fossil fuel demand. Under a climate-optimistic scenario, a dramatic shift away from fossil fuels would be expected. Meanwhile a climate-pessimistic scenario would also be costly for many developing nations.
While extensive research examines the expectation of threats posed by climate change, the probability and impact of the climate-optimistic scenario. Although the Paris COP21 talks provided some indication of future policies, there remains significant uncertainty about how this will actually happen. The lack of certainty creates a mismatch between the opportunities to develop and invest in resources (Mitchell et al. 2015) . This paper argues that even in the face of considerable uncertainty, countries should consider these three challenges since the impact, if it occurs, will be severe.
THE SCALE OF THE CARBON MARKET RISK FOR FOSSIL FUEL PRODUCERS

THE WORLD'S CARBON BUDGET AND STRANDED RESERVES
Fossil fuels may be plentiful from a geological point of view, but if the world burns all available fossil fuels the impact on the climate will be severe. Emerging research suggests that the world should aim to restrict the accumulated carbon and other greenhouse gases emitted between 2011 and 2050 to 1,100 Gigatonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (McGlade and Ekins, 2014; Allen et al. 2009; Allen et al. 2015 , Meinhausen et al. 2009 ). This limit is referred to as the world's 'carbon budget'. Breaking this budget significantly risks deteriorating global environmental and social conditions and 'runaway' climate change-in which natural positive feedback loops contribute to ever greater climate change effects.
In comparison, the estimated combustible carbon dioxide content of the world's reserves 3 of oil, gas, and coal in 2014 was 2,900 gigatonnes (McGlade and Ekins 2014) . Therefore, to avoid using up the world's carbon budget and causing extreme climate change, two thirds of existing fossil fuel reserves must remain undeveloped.
Keeping two thirds of reserves in the ground necessitates a significant reduction in the world's use of fossil fuels. This, in turn, necessitates a long-term decline in the demand for fossil fuels, which could occur if governments impose carbon taxes or similar policies 4 ; if there is a broad transition to alternative energy supplies, such as nuclear or renewables; or if economic activity becomes significantly more efficient in using energy. Reserves may also remain undeveloped if governments impose policies to limit the market supply of fossil fuel resources.
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A fall in fossil fuel demand, other things equal, will lead to a fall in fossil fuel prices. This might lead to existing reserves remaining undeveloped or 'stranded'. Meanwhile projects that remain commercially viable will be less valuable. This in turn may diminish the rents and therefore tax revenues fossil fuel extraction can generate for producing countries.
To understand this, consider an example from the global oil market. The price received for a barrel of oil is roughly the same for all projects after accounting for relatively small differences in the quality of oil (such as viscosity) and transport costs. However, costs will differ considerably across location and geology. Figure 2 shows a representative global supply curve that ranks all oil projects from least to most expensive in terms of unit costs of production. For any given market price, lower cost projects, on the left part of the supply curve, will have a higher asset value per barrel than high cost projects. If the producer price falls, say in response to a climate policy, some projects with costs higher than the prevailing price will become stranded, while some value of all remaining operating projects will be foregone.
Figure 2. How a fall in demand reduces value and strands fossil fuel reserves
Asset stranding and significant falls in values in the fossil fuel industry are not new, the recent commodity price slump has stranded many projects already and fossil fuel companies have seen the value of their assets reduced by many millions of dollars. However, the scale of such an outcome under, for example, an effective global climate policy would be entirely new. It would also imply a permanence not normally considered during commodity price slumps. For example, figure 3 shows estimates of the proportion of reserves already discovered that could become permanently stranded if the world keeps to its carbon budget. 
THE LIKELIHOOD OF CARBON MARKET RISK
Whether governments can implement effective climate policies to reduce global fossil fuel consumption or whether alternative energy sources gain sufficient market share is highly uncertain. This paper does not directly address this uncertainty but assumes that the probability is greater than zero. Further, even if the probability is low, the impact on fossil-fuel rich countries may be very large for the reasons discussed. This has some corollary to the so-called 'fat-tailed risk' or the 'precautionary principle' of climate damages-where the probability of an impact is low, but the impact itself is high, necessitating precautionary actions (Weitzman 2011) . Given these conditions fossil-fuel rich countries should carefully consider how their policy choices might be modified by carbon market risk and what type of, and how urgent, such precautionary actions should be. We will address these policies in the final part of this paper.
The likelihood of a permanent fall in fossil fuel demand, or 'carbon market risk' rest on four factors.
First, governments of carbon emitting countries could impose policies that keep emissions within the global carbon budget. This could take the form of demand-side policies, such as consumer taxes, or supply-side measures such as producer taxes or quantity restrictions, or some mix of these policies. The Paris COP21 made some advance towards countries imposing climate policies but it is unclear how the result of these negotiations will influence policy.
Second, the market share of renewables, nuclear and other alternatives to fossil fuels could increase substantially. Solar and wind power capacity has increased exponentially during the last decade, although starting from a small base in comparison to fossil fuel-derived energy. Currently 13 percent of global primary energy supply is from renewables. Projected shares of renewable energy to total energy in 2030 in this share range from 14 percent-by Exxon-to 43 percent-by Geotechnical and Environment Associates (Meister Consultants Group 2015). The International Energy Agency, an often quoted authority on the subject, forecasts that renewables will still account for only 15 percent of global energy supply by 2040 (IEA 2015) . However, the IEA has consistently underestimated renewables growth in the past, and so can be considered relatively pessimistic (Metayer et al. 2015) .
Third, energy efficiency measures could improve to reduce future energy demand. There are signs that this will happen. The world economy is gradually 'decarbonising'-greenhouse gas emissions per dollar of GDP are falling. From 2000 to 2014, the carbon intensity of economic activity has fallen by 1.3 percent each year on average, although total greenhouse gas emissions are still rising as the global economy grew 3.7 percent a year on average over the same period (PWC 2015) . This decarbonisation trend is set to continue. The carbon intensity of the Chinese economy, already the largest greenhouse gas emitter in the world, fell by two percent in this period, and 6.7 percent in 2013 to 2014. In addition, Green and Stern (2015) forecast that Chinese carbon emissions will peak by 2025.
A fourth factor is the success or failure of carbon capture and storage (CCS) methods-including both initiatives to expand 'carbon sinks' such as forests, and technologies that directly prevent carbon emission from entering the atmosphere. If these develop, there is less need to restrict fossil fuel production for climate change purposes: the carbon and other greenhouse gases can be removed from the atmosphere and stored. However, CCS faces three problems: first, aside from forests, man-made CCS methods are not currently commercially viable; second, retrofitting CCS technologies to transport, power stations and other carbon emitters appears prohibitively expensive; and third, there is currently few viable methods to safely store carbon without sufficiently reducing the risks of carbon leaking into the atmosphere after being 'captured (Helm 2015) .
FROM STRANDED ASSETS TO STRANDED NATIONS: THREE CHALLENGES
The risk of stranded assets for fossil fuel investors is receiving increasing attention and concern from researchers and analysts, in particular the work by Carbon Tracker (see Leaton 2013) . If stranded assets are a concern for investors, we argue they should be an even bigger concern for many fossil fuel-rich developing countries.
We focus on fossil fuel-rich developing countries (FFRDCs), which we define as those countries: 1) whose value of known fossil fuel reserves is at least 25 percent of their total wealth (Produced, Intangible, Foreign and Natural assets) 6 OR the value of fossil fuel production is at least 10 percent of GDP; AND 2) whose GNI per capita is less than USD 12,736 (Middle, Low middle or Low income country definition according to World Bank classification). Figure 4 maps these FFRDCs; the appendix describes how we calculated fossil fuel values. For these FFRDCs, the realisation of carbon market risk-the widespread adoption of carbon policies, rise in alternative energy use or the decarbonisation of the world economy-resulting in a permanent fall in the producer price of fossil fuels presents three challenges.
CHALLENGE 1: FFRDCS ARE HIGHLY EXPOSED TO CARBON MARKET RISK
According to one estimate, of the USD 25 trillion of fossil fuel value at risk, fossil fuel-rich governments face 80 percent of the risk (Nelson 2014) . A fall in fossil fuel prices for producers significantly reduces the rents available from fossil fuel extraction on existing investments, and makes further development of reserves less profitable, potentially stranding much of their fossil fuel reserves and related assets. This reduces government revenues collected from fossil fuel extraction and non-fiscal benefits to the domestic economy. A decline in government revenues in particular restricts the ability of governments to support economic development-although strong public financial management practices can help governments, in the short term, to shield their budgets to abrupt changes to government revenues.
Fossil fuel-rich developing countries (FFRDCs) currently hold a significantly proportion of their national wealth in the form of fossil fuel reserves and related assets (figure 5) and their fossil fuel wealth is more at risk of a permanent decline in prices than non-FFRDCs (figure 7). The possibility of a permanent fall in fossil fuel use exposes these countries to the risk of losing this portion of national wealth.
7 Figure 5 shows that FFRDCs ranked according to the value of fossil fuel reserves to GDP. Their median ratio of fossil fuel reserves to GDP is 3.66, compared with a median for non-FFRCs of 0.58. Note that prospective countries that are potentially rich in fossil fuels but with few developed projects and currently low production rates-Tanzania, Uganda, Guatemala, among others-do not fall within our definition of 'fossil fuel-rich developing countries'. However, the analysis and policy implications in this paper are highly relevant for these countries as they create policies that will govern their sectors over the next few decades. Important factors in valuing FFRDCs' reserves are the assumptions on fossil fuel prices, costs and the social discount rate. We have chosen to use prices realised in 2015 which are low by historical standards, and so produce a relatively optimistic -for FFRDCs-estimate of the value at risk. We analyse the value of production from reserves, rather than rent, so ignore costs of exploration, development and production. In addition, we have chosen a social discount rate of four percent, as used by the World Bank to estimate wealth values in World Bank (2011). Figure 7 shows the effect of a simulated decline in prices for the whole set of fossil fuel-rich developing countries, comparing the value of reserves given constant prices and the value of reserves given a steady decline in prices of two percent year-on-year. This price decline is assumed purely to illustrate the effect of a declining price path. In practice, the price decline may be higher or lower than this, and is unlikely to be a smooth decline.
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The assumption of a smooth decline in prices abstracts away from the likely path of prices. The combination of climate change policies and the rising market share of alternative energy sources may result in an abrupt and permanent fall in prices at some point in the future. For further discussion of our modelling of a price decline, please refer to the Appendix. The value-at-risk column in figure 7 shows the difference in the value of reserves assuming current prices are maintained, and the value of reserves assuming a year-on-year decline of two percent. The difference is largely determined by the rate at which countries can deplete their reserves, which we assume to be equal to the current production rate in each country. Countries with lower reserveto-production ratios are likely able to extract their resources faster than those with high reserve-toproduction ratios and avoid more of the effect of a fall in future values. Venezuela, for example, has large reserves and low production rates, so could see a fifth of the value of its reserves cut under the assumed fall in prices.
CHALLENGE 2: FFRDCS COULD BE LESS ABLE TO DIVERSIFY THEIR CARBON MARKET RISK
Not only are FFRDCs exposed to a possible permanent fall in fossil fuel use, but-compared with fossil fuel companies-FFRDCs are less able to diversify their exposure (Mitchell et al. 2015) . This suggests that the arguments made of the dangers of stranded assets for fossil fuel companies are even more relevant for fossil fuel-rich developing countries.
The ability to diversify or reduce their exposure to carbon market risk depends on two factors. First, the time and cost of converting their fossil fuel related assets into other non-related assets, such as cash-known in the financial sense as the asset's liquidity. Second, the ability to hold a diversified portfolio of assets.
In terms of market liquidity, companies can relatively easily divest from fossil fuel related assets into assets less exposed to carbon market risk. While it is likely that as more companies seek to divest liquidity will fall, but with sufficient time, an orderly transition can occur. Companies own the extraction rights to relatively few booked reserves, with relatively high production rates. For example, in 2013, the reserve-to-production ratios for all oil and gas companies were 12.8 years and 13.9 years respectively (EY 2013). Therefore, companies can, in principle, stop replacing their reserves and run down their existing reserves over the next 13 to 14 years. Although, given that most oil companies currently seek to maintain or increase their reserves, this is unlikely to happen immediately.
In comparison to companies, FFRDCs hold fossil fuel assets that are less financially liquid. For FFRDCs, fossil fuel assets can typically only be converted at the rate based on the time taken to develop and produce from an extraction project. Using past reserve-to-production ratios as an indicator of the speed at which countries can convert their subsoil assets into cash, figure 8 shows that most countries must wait many decades (a median of 45 years) to liquidate their fossil fuel wealth, unless they can find ways to increase their rates of production.
For those countries that enter development agreements with private sector companies, the depletion of reserves will be equal between countries and companies-the same reserve is being depleted. What accounts for difference in reserve-to-production ratios is the national ownership and production of reserves led by state-owned enterprises in many FFRDCs. For instance, 18 of the 23 countries in figure 8 have national oil companies. In addition to being able to liquidate their fossil fuel assets quicker than FFRDCs, companies also own or manage a more diversified portfolio of fossil fuel assets, for example across a variety of different countries and with different cost profiles; in contrast to countries whose fossil fuel reserves are geographically bound.
Further, few resource rich countries have successfully diversified their economies and holding foreign assets has been limited by the rate of depletion and ability to hold revenues as savings (Venables 2016) . Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), in which funds are invested in foreign assets, are one way for a government to hold a wider range of non-fossil fuel linked assets. However, making funds available for this purpose can be difficult given government expenditure needs within the country, and can increase the risk of inappropriate use of these funds (Bauer 2014). Further, the assets of sovereign wealth funds owned by FFRDC governments represent only three percent of their fossil fuel reserves on average (see figure 9 ). 
CHALLENGE 3: FFRDCS MAY PURSUE POLICIES THAT INCREASE EXPOSURE TO CARBON MARKET RISK
In addition to being exposed and limited in their ability to diversify from carbon market risk, some of the economic policies common to fossil fuel-rich countries may increase FFRDCs' exposure.
First, National Oil Companies (NOCs), common in oil-rich countries, involve the investment of state capital into fossil fuel assets. If the expected life of these assets is long enough that declining oil, gas or coal prices will impact returns, or a government cannot liquidate these assets at a reasonable value, then governments, by investing in an NOC, may be increasing the exposure of national wealth and public assets to carbon market risk. This exposure increases for NOCs that operate reserves abroad in the same manner as other oil companies are exposed to carbon market risk (see above). Figure 10 shows the significant values of state ownership in NOCs in FFRDCs (for which there is data). Second, some governments seek to capture value by encouraging the domestic private sector to participate in oil, gas, and coal supply chains, often known as promoting 'local content'. This aims to increase the share of the proceeds from extraction retained by the domestic economy. In addition, some local content policies aim to develop skills of local workers and advance business practices that spread to other sectors in the economy not directly related to extraction. However, whatever the objectives, such policies to promote local content may increase a country's exposure to the carbon market risk by increasing the total share of a country's assets (either foregone public revenues, or a share of the nation's human or physical capital) that would be exposed to a fall in fossil fuel demand. If the public, physical and human capital investment in local content delivers high returns-both in the financial and social sense-in the earlier rather than later years, or if the skills and business developed to supply fossil industries can be applied to other sectors, the carbon market risk is reduced. However, if local content takes many years to develop, foregoes significant tax revenues, or has limited value outside the fossil fuel sector, these policies may increase countries' exposure.
Figure 10. State owned oil companies
Third, fossil fuel rich countries have tended to develop economies that are relatively carbonintensive. Figure 11 shows that petroleum and coal producers (highlighted in red and blue respectively) emit a larger amount of carbon per dollar of GDP than non-fossil fuel producers). A chief policy that has led to this carbon intensive development is the tendency for fossil fuel producers to subsidise fuel consumption (Friedrichs and Inderwildi 2013) . This is a concern for countries wishing to reduce global carbon emissions, but also a concern for fossil fuel-rich countries seeking to reduce exposure to the carbon market risk. These countries could suffer in two ways. First, if their trading partners (such as the European Union) impose a carbon consumption tax: a policy in which the consumers of products are taxed according to the carbon content of the product, rather than a tax imposed on carbon emitters (Helm 2015) . Second, they would suffer if climate finance initiatives reward those countries that do reduce fossil fuel consumption or emissions.
POLICY PROSPECTS
These three related challenges are highly significant for FFRDCs. Countries' fossil fuel wealth represents an opportunity to fund a significant expansion in their productive capital base and to promote economic development. Not extracting their fossil fuel wealth could eliminate an important path to economic development and write off a significant portion of national wealth.
In the face of these challenges, we discuss four policy options FFRDC governments should consider.
1) Diversify the economy to reduce exposure to carbon market risk
1a. Diversify the economy away from fossil fuel industries. Resource rich countries cannot liquidate their fossil fuel assets easily-unlike investors who can sell the financial assets in a market-but fossil fuel revenues can kick start industrial growth if used well (see, for example, precept 10 of the Natural Resource Charter). Diversification means increasing the relative size of sectors not positively related to the carbon-adjusted value of fossil fuels. This also means carefully considering the risk of promoting fossil fuel intensive industries, including downstream sectors benefitting from fossil fuel inputs.
1b. Reduce state investment in the fossil fuel industry.
The third challenge we have described shows that it is not only reserves that can become stranded. State capital invested in state owned companies, infrastructure and the supply chains may also fail to provide a sufficient return to the state if the world reduces it use of fossil fuels. If the expected life and payoff of these assets is long enough that declining oil, gas or coal prices will impact returns, or a government cannot liquidate these assets at a reasonable value, then governments may wish to limit investments in these assets. This may be the case for instance if a state company is expected to provide a sufficient positive return only in the long-term, or if its international operations will expose additional state capital to carbon market risk. Building up a profitable state owned company could potentially take longer than the time taken for carbon-adjusted fossil fuels values to fall. Consistent with this notion, Marcel (2016) advises that governments should base decisions about how much to invest in NOCs (and how ambitious to craft their NOC agendas) in part on how long the country expects to have viable reserves to produce. Climate market risk presents a potential further reduction in the expected period of economic returns from the sector.
1c. Reconsider investing state and human capital in fossil fuel related supply chains.
Some value of local businesses and a workforce specialised in fossil fuel extraction may also become stranded.
Where local suppliers and labour can participate in supply chains relatively quickly without protection or subsidies, then the country may be able to benefit from investment in human capital. However, if education or training workers takes decades, and if these skills are not transferrable to other industries, not only will state capital invested in workers be left stranded, but so may the human capital. The workers trained exclusively for working in fossil fuel industry could have improved their lives by developing a different set of skills suitable for sectors not at risk. Similar to countries with high reserve-to-production ratios, a policy of investing in human capital is at risk if returns are expected only in the long term. Marcel (2016) suggests that governments build local content policies that maximise the associated benefits for other sectors of the economy. Further, such strategies should carefully consider their value in a potential post-fossil fuel global economy.
1d. Reconsider additional exposure to assets whose value is correlated with the climate policy adjusted price of energy.
State assets whose value positively correlates with the oil price in a world in which a widespread climate policy is adopted will add to the risk countries face from their fossil fuel assets being stranded. As such, certain assets in sovereign wealth funds and state equity in companies who themselves are not well diversified from carbon market risk are vulnerable. Instead, governments could hedge against the carbon market risk by minimising capital held in such assets, or otherwise investing in assets that are negatively correlated with or at least not correlated to the carbon adjusted prices of fossil fuels in a world in which a climate policy is widely adopted.
10 2) Promote the competitiveness of the fossil fuel sector to reduce the potential extent of stranding
2a. Consider whether to promote continued or increased exploration through licensing
While the world may already have more reserves than can be safely burned, it does not follow that the best course of action for a country is to stop exploration. Development and extraction are costly, so it is better for the country and investors to explore for reserves that are less costly to extract, if the cost of exploration does not outweigh this difference in development and carbon-adjusted extraction costs. Referring to the supply and demand graph in figure 2, some new discoveries may be situated further on the left of the global supply curve than the country's existing projects and thus less likely to become stranded as prices fall. In other words, new, cheaper discoveries that can be brought to production quickly can displace more expensive fields-the pace of which is subject to a country's reserve-to-production ratios, as discussed above. Further, state capital is not usually committed to the exploration process making it lower risk than other policy trade-offs.
An important caveat is whether there is a high likelihood that companies will discover cheaper resources. If a country is at the point where further discoveries are likely to be smaller fields with higher costs than what companies have previously discovered, further exploration is less likely to reduce countries' exposure to carbon market risk.
As discussed by Collier and Venables (2014) and Caney (2016) , there may be a moral case made for the lowest income countries being permitted to extract fossil fuels even after other countries have halted their extraction. Under such circumstances companies and countries may still find it attractive to explore for oil in the poorest societies-who may stand to benefit the most from the dwindling demand for fossil fuels.
This policy fits with established good practice for countries. Companies' interests in acquiring a license will rest on prospectivity. For frontier regions, investing in geological and geophysical surveys before licensing reduces geological uncertainty for prospective license holders-whether it indicates an abundance or otherwise of resources.
Nor is this policy necessarily in conflict with the recommendation to diversify the economy. Discoveries of reserves with cheaper extraction costs does not necessarily imply a relative expansion in the extractive sector.
2b. Reduce 'above ground risks' and costs to further reduce the risk of stranding
A second option to mitigate stranding risk is to improve governance and reduce 'above ground' risks and therefore increase risk-adjusted returns expected by investors. Cust and Harding (2015) suggest that countries with strong political institutions have an advantage over countries with weak institutions in attracting exploration investment given the likely lower risk-adjusted returns imposed by weak governance. Arezki and van der Ploeg (2016) argue that economic openness can improve investor attractiveness. Consistent with these findings, governments can undertake a host of reforms that make their country more attractive to investment and, in a similar manner to the first proposal above, projects will be situated further to the left of the global supply curve if above ground risks fall.
Countries can also improve their attractiveness to investors by improving infrastructure such as power, roads and pipelines, and skilled labour. However, a government must consider how much public capital to invest in these improvements to attract company investment given the potentially shortened period for making returns. A government may wish to choose improvements that minimise public capital commitments relative to attracting company investment (some public investment in facilitating exploration might be one policy) and choose improvements that have large spillover benefits to other areas of the economy. For example, energy or transportation infrastructure that also benefits other sectors of the economy.
3) Avoid subsidising fuel consumption and promote policies consistent with higher future carbon prices
The IMF, World Bank, OECD and G20, as well as guides such as the Natural Resource Charter already advise countries against using fuel subsidies. They can put a large strain on the national budget, leverage the risk from oil price volatility as subsidy payments must increase when the oil price increases, and are often socially regressive-the primary beneficiaries are citizens with access to automobiles and central heating, not necessarily the poorest in a country. For instance, Del Granado et al. (2012) estimates that the wealthiest 20 percent in developing countries get a disproportionate 43 percent of the benefit from fossil fuel subsidies, while the poorest 20 percent get only 7 percent (Arze et al. 2012 ).
For those countries that subsidize fossil fuel consumption already (Ross et al. 2017) , reducing subsidies during periods of low prices reduces the immediate impact on consumers (as the effective subsidy is low). Further, governments need to consider how long industries that rely on fossil fuels, such as transport, can take to switch to alternative energy sources, and calibrate that with a plan to eliminate subsidies.
4) Consider the time-profile trade-offs regarding the depletion rate of the resource base
A key result from this paper is that countries with high reserve-to-production ratios are most at risk from seeing some reserves stranded. One implication of this is that producer countries may choose to accelerate the pace of licensing (the main lever by which governments can control the rate of resource depletion): converting their fossil fuel wealth into cash before falling prices reduce their value.
However, there are two factors that may deter accelerated production. Stevens et al. (2015) argue that for low income countries a slower pace of licensing may give time for government to improve institutions and with it, potentially earn more income in the future. In addition, accelerated recovery from individual oil wells can reduce well pressure and reduce the total amount recovered. This poses a dilemma for countries who may need to time to develop strong institutions governing their fossil fuel sectors, but with the risk that fossil fuel prices fall before they can do so.
Further, even if faster development is an optimum strategy for countries on an individual basis, if all producers do the same, supply rises and reduces prices for a given demand; a result known as the "green paradox" (Sinn 2008; Ploeg and Withagen 2013) . Previous authors have expressed the paradox in terms of an attempt to reduce carbon emissions in the form of a carbon tax ends up increasing emissions as producers increase production in the near term. For FFRDCs, the same response to reduce exposure to the carbon market risk brings forward the decline in fossil fuel prices and weakens the logic of accelerating production.
The optimal time profile of depletion under demand uncertainty will also likely depend on how much sunk state capital has already occurred. In other words, the relatively maturity of the sector as well as extent of state involvement will play a role. Less mature and prospective sectors may be better off deferring or cancelling extraction as the prospects for declining demand for fossil fuels increases.
APPROPRIATE POLICY ACTION UNDER TWO SCENARIOS FACED BY FFRDCS
The above discussion lays out a range of policies that FFRDC governments may find appropriate if fossil prices did permanently decline. However, in the short term, some of these policies may impose a cost to countries. Without clear policy action on climate change these scenarios remain highly uncertain for fossil fuel rich countries, so deciding whether to impose these policies is difficult. To help consider policy makers' choices it is useful to consider two scenarios for FFRDCs. These represent two contrasting versions of the future; reality is likely to be somewhere between these two extremes.
In the first scenario there is no significant fall in demand in fossil fuels (the carbon market risk is not realised), carbon emissions continue past the carbon budget, and the resulting change in the climate continues to impact livelihoods. In this scenario, FFRDCs are able to draw benefits from their fossil fuel resources but find that climate change may adversely impact other areas of the economy, such as farming, water and low-lying coastal settlements.
In the second scenario, there is a significant fall in fossil fuel demand (carbon market risk is realised), FFRDCs are unable to fully benefit from their fossil fuel resources, but the worst of climate change may be avoided. In this scenario, FFRDCs may not face significant climatic costs, but the opportunity to fund economic development via fossil fuel extraction is significantly diminished.
Each scenario might require a different policy response. Should policy makers continue to develop their fossil fuel reserves and invest public capital in doing so, or diversify as quickly as possible before fossil fuel demand falls? Figure 12 summarises the policy options available to FFRDC governments and whether they are more or less likely to be appropriate under our two scenarios: one in which carbon market risk or a permanent fall in fossil demand does not occur, and one in which it does occur. With reality likely being somewhere between these two extreme scenarios. While we suggest a level of appropriateness bearing in mind that the appropriateness of most policies are always subject to local factors in the country at the time. Several of the policies are appropriate under both scenarios. In these cases, countries are more likely to benefit from the policy no matter which scenario is realised and so the risk of governments choosing an inappropriate policy depending on the climate policy scenario is relatively low. Fewer policies are likely to be appropriate under scenario of declining demand for fossil fuels but depend on other factors.
CONCLUSION
While still highly uncertain, there is a growing likelihood that fossil fuel use will decline in the future. This is not only from the positive outcome of the Paris COP21 talks, but the emerging evidence of the decarbonisation of global economic activity and the rise in renewable energy sources. In the long-run, global demand for carbon-intensive energy relative might fall, reducing the market price for fossil fuels. This creates the risk of 'stranded nations' -where resources under the ground become commercially unviable to extract and a substantial share of a nation's wealth may permanently lose its value.
This paper identifies three challenges for fossil fuel resource rich developing countries. First, we show that these countries are highly exposed to a decline in fossil fuel demand, with their median ratio of oil and gas reserves to GDP is 3.66, compared with a median for non-FFRCs of 0.58. Second, they are less able to diversify away from this risk than fossil fuel companies or investors-oil companies on average hold only around 13 years of reserves on their balance sheets, whereas FFRDCs hold an average of 45 years of known reserves at current production rates. Third, these countries often find themselves under political pressure to implement policies that may expose them to further risk. For example, supporting fossil fuel linked infrastructure and skills that relies on long time horizons for payoffs to the country, subsidising fossil fuel consumption that extends carbon-intensity of production, or by creating large, internationally operating national oil companies whose operations may exposes national wealth to additional carbon market risk.
In response, we examine four broad policy implications arising from this carbon market risk that fossil-fuel rich developing countries should consider. First, developing countries rich in fossil fuel resources should seek to reduce their exposure to a decline in fossil fuel demand by diversifying away from their dependence on fossil fuels and avoiding locking up additional state capital in fossil fuel linked investments and expenditures. Second, they should seek to promote the competitiveness of their fossil-fuel sectors by reducing costs and investor risks. Third, they should avoid subsidising or otherwise failing to internalise the carbon costs linked to fossil fuel production. Fourth, they should consider the time profile of their resource base and the implications of climate policy for optimal depletion rates and savings rates.
The uncertainties regarding the timing and likelihood of the imposition of climate policies make these decisions difficult. This suggests governments of fossil fuel-rich developing countries would benefit from detailed analysis of future scenarios (perhaps along the lines of what we present in this paper). Yet in many cases, our policy recommendations align with generally held good practice for such countries. While their prioritisation, sequencing and in some cases direction may require modification when the expectations of future global climate policies are considered, the ideas expressed here suggest good governance of extractives and the fight to alleviate poverty need not conflict with global efforts to prevent climate change. Many of the principles of extractives governance apply no matter what the future holds.
APPENDIX
The set of Fossil Fuel Rich Developing Countries listed in figure 5 is defined as those countries with:  GNI per capita 2010 -2014 average of an USD 12,736 or less  Proportion of value of oil, gas and coal production (2014) to GDP (2014) of 10 percent or more  Proportion of oil, gas and coal reserves values to total national assets of 25 percent or more.
Production values are calculation by multiplying the unit amount by the following respective prices:
 Oil price taken as Brent Crude spot price USD 36 per barrel  Natural Gas for European, Central Asia and Middle East and North Africa regions USD 5.81 per mmBtu  Natural Gas for Asia Pacific and East Sub Saharan Africa regions USD 9.50 per mmBtu  Natural Gas for North America, Latin America & Caribbean and West Sub Saharan Africa USD 1.92 per mmBtu  Coal is taken as USD 92.7 for European producers (equivalent to the Northwest Europe marker coal price), USD 74.3 for North American and LAC producers (equivalent to the US Central Appalachian coal spot price), USD 101 for Central Asian producers (equivalent to Asian marker coal price), and USD 166.9 for Asia-Pacific producers (equivalent to the Japan coking coal import cif price).
Reserve values are calculated by assuming a constant production rate for the number of years of available reserves (equivalent to the reserve to production ratio) with future values discounted using a rate of four percent, as used in World Bank (2011).
A country's weighted reserve to production ratio is the reserve to production ratios of oil, gas and coal weighted by the proportion value of production of each commodity:
Weighted reserve-to-production (R-to-P) ratio = [(Value of Oil production/Value of total production)*R-to-P of oil] *[(Value of gas production/Value of total production)*R-to-P of gas] *[(Value of coal production/Value of total production)*R-to-P of coal]
Modelled price decline of fossil fuels
To illustrate the effect of a long-run decline in prices, we assumed a smooth decline in prices (two percent each year from the base case) for both oil, gas and coal. We calculate the value of reserves as the amount of production each year until countries deplete their current reserve amounts multiplied by the assumed prices of production, with future values discounted by the social discount rate of four percent. Crucially, this does not account for extraction costs. The income derived from extraction that is typically shared between companies and governments would therefore be less than revenue estimates presented here, and the proportional value-at-risk larger.
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The value-at-risk column in figure 7 shows the difference in the value of reserves assuming current prices are maintained, and the value of reserves assuming a year-on-year decline of two percent. The difference is largely determined by the rate at which countries can deplete their reserves, which we assume to be equal to past production rate in each country. Countries with lower reserve-toproduction ratios are likely able to extract their resources faster than those with high reserve-toproduction ratios and avoid more of the effect of a fall in future values. Venezuela, for example, has large reserves and low production rates, so sees a fifth of the value of its reserves cut given the assumed fall in prices.
Fixed production rates is a strong assumption. As we discuss below, countries may seek to increase production to monetise their fossil fuel wealth before a significant decline in prices. However, there will be limits to how much countries can do this based on the infrastructure they have and the ability to attract sufficient capital to enhance existing infrastructure. Furthermore, investing more capital to increase production rates simultaneously increases the capital stock that is exposes to the carbon market risk. So countries face a dilemma in this regard that does not necessarily mean greater production capacity is optimal.
